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The raised hands, the eyes turned towards the heavens, the tilted head bathed in an 
unseen light: these features of ecstasy are offered up as symptoms of pathology in 
the Iconographie photographique de la Salpêtrière (1876-1880).1 This volume, prepared by 
the students of the great doctor of hysteria, Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) – and from 
which the photograph above is taken – lies at the intersection of medicine and technology; the 
elusive stages of a shadowy disorder were fixed on photographic plates, then developed, 
collected, and published in a reference work to which medical professionals and enlightened 
members of the public could then refer.2 The pose struck by the patient, as Charcot and his 
disciples were well aware, was familiar from religious paintings. In L'hystérie dans l’art 
(1885), a document used at the Salpêtrière and compiled by one of Charcot’s associates, 
reference is made to Giovanni Lanfranco’s Ecstasy of St. Margaret of Cortona (1622), where 
the central figure also raises her hands and eyes, while tilting her head towards a Christ 
descending from the heavens.3 Indeed, the similarity between the hospital photographs and 
religious iconography gave Charcot the warrant to embark upon the retrospective diagnoses of 
the great saints and mystics of the Roman Catholic Church, a key pillar of the medical 
profession’s struggle for power and status in Third Republic France.4  
The visual relationship between the photograph of the anonymous subject and the 
images of St. Margaret, a reformed sinner in the tradition of Mary Magdalene, was not 
established accidentally.5 The sexual connotations are carried over from the precursor to the 
patient insofar as the anonymous young woman is as undressed as she is distressed, her thin 
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nightgown riding up to expose her naked thighs and slipping down, too, at the shoulder – her 
performance coaxed and captured by the male photographer for the perusal of his peers.  
This complex of sex, religion, and pathology provided one of the contexts for the 
categories of mysticism T.S. Eliot developed in his Clark Lectures, delivered in 1926 at 
Trinity College, Cambridge, and posthumously edited and published by Ronald Schuchard 
as The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry (1993). In his sixth lecture, Eliot described what he 
saw as the tendency of the sixteenth-century vernacular mystic, St. Teresa of Ávila, to 
“substitute divine love for human love, and for the former to take on the characteristics of the 
latter.”6 This “romantic” mysticism was contrasted unfavorably with the “classical” monastic 
Latinate mysticism of the twelfth-century figure, Richard of St. Victor, in which Eliot 
detected “the development and subsumption of emotion and feeling through intellect into the 
vision of God.”7 These categories draw on the account of the creative process Eliot outlined 
earlier in his career in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” and pertain to his ongoing and 
very public dispute with John Middleton Murry – himself a one-time Clark Lecturer who had 
recommended Eliot for the role – conducted on the pages of their respective periodicals, 
the Criterion and the Adelphi.8 Donald J. Childs has presented Eliot’s personal struggle with 
the aforementioned religious categories as a central personal and creative challenge negotiated 
throughout the poetry and the essays.9 Here I note that one reason Eliot found it so easy to 
condemn the sensuality of St. Teresa – despite his previous distaste, as I explain below, for 
not “sensuality,” but rather “sensibility” – was the cultural significance of Charcot’s program 
of retrospective diagnosis and the interlinking of the pathological, the sexual, and the 
religious, observable in the photograph at the head of this paper – a subject that has been 
explored in greater detail elsewhere in important studies of the hysteria diagnosis.10  
This essay will have a sharper focus on the significance, for Eliot’s life and work, of 
the intertwining of religion and psychology in late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
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thought. These twin concerns informed both Eliot’s disdain for aspects of psychology and his 
often unacknowledged recourse to other psychological sources. Both elements come together 
in Eliot’s claim, made in a lecture on the early modern dramatist George Chapman in 
Cambridge in 1924, that psychology is a halfway measure: “Psychology must lead you in the 
end, either to glands or to theology.”11 Eliot’s distaste for “psychology” here principally 
means “psychoanalysis.” The work of Sigmund Freud was, too, bound up with the complexes 
surrounding the opening photograph: Freud had been a student of Charcot’s at the Salpêtrière; 
he began his career with a study of hysteria; and shared his teacher’s antipathy towards 
religion.12 Totem and Taboo (1913) in many ways channels the energies of the 
aforementioned photograph. In the context of Eliot’s talk, the criticism of psychoanalysis was 
prompted by the burgeoning trend, encouraged by Freud himself, of applying 
psychoanalytical principles to the analysis of literary creations.13  
Eliot accepted that psychology had a therapeutic function – he himself benefited from 
such treatment in 1921, as I explore later – but he was unconvinced by the proposition that a 
psychological science, no matter how developed, could play the cultural, and even artistic and 
emotional, role in society that religion once had played.14 Indeed, in opposition to Charcot 
and Freud, and far from using psychology to re-evaluate religious phenomena, Eliot was more 
likely to use religious tropes to expose the limitations of psychological discourse. In this, Eliot 
is in line with a number of early twentieth-century figures who sought to respond to Charcot’s 
materialism with new accounts of religious phenomena: the philosopher and psychologist 
William James (1842-1910), the philosopher of religion Friedrich von Hügel (1852-1925), 
and the writer on mysticism Evelyn Underhill (1875-1941), among them.15  
Eliot’s distaste for psychoanalysis did not extend to all psychology. He was fascinated 
by the alternative trajectory of psychological thought he encountered while a student at 
Harvard, beginning with Pierre Janet (1859-1947) and then running through the work of the 
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psychic researcher, Frederic W.H. Myers (1843-1901), James, and Underhill; this essay opens 
with an exploration of Eliot’s engagement with Janet in particular before going on to consider 
how Myers, James, and Underhill adapted Janet’s ideas. The psychology of the subconscious 
or subliminal mind provided a basis for thinking through extraordinary phenomena, including 
the religious illumination caricatured in the photograph above and the creative process. I offer 
an example of how this worked in practice for Eliot in a reading of “The Hollow Men” 
(1925). Thus, in keeping with work by Jan Goldstein, Mark S. Micale, Judith Ryan, and Sonu 
Shamdasani, I outline an alternative route for the influence of psychology on both modernism 
and writing about modernism; not, that is, the well-known path Charcot’s concerns took 
through Freud and Jacques Lacan, but a different itinerary taking in Janet and Myers.16  
By drawing on recent work exploring the impact on modernism of various religious 
cultures, my study aims to provide an alternative take on Childs’s claim that for Eliot, 
“scepticism” is “as much part of his nature as his mystical impulse.”17 Far from being his 
personal quirk, the doublemindedness in evidence throughout Eliot’s oeuvre can be 
understood as at once a reaction to and an exploration of the porous boundaries between 
religion and science at the turn of the twentieth century. In this reading of Eliot, the poet-
critic’s midlife commitment to Anglo-Catholicism and his advocacy for the claims of 
institutional religion did not issue in a repudiation of his earlier fascination with the more 
experimental aspects of religious thought that characterized his student years; such 
experiments are an informing context as much for his famous essay, “The Metaphysical 
Poets” (1921), as for the later lectures published as The Use of Poetry and the Use of 
Criticism (1933).  
 
I. Civilization and its Dissociations: Janet and “The Metaphysical Poets” 
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Pierre Janet, like Freud, had been a student of Charcot’s. While Janet, in his treatment of 
traumatized patients, employed hypnotism as a therapeutic tool – the technique having for a 
time been given a respectable sheen by Charcot’s very public demonstrations of its 
effectiveness – the relationships of the two Frenchmen with their respective patients couldn’t 
have been more different.18 Charcot felt able to diagnose those in his care on the basis of the 
physical symptoms they manifested alone; he outlined a systematic account of the behaviors a 
hysteric could be expected to exhibit.19 In many ways, for Charcot, there was no difference 
between diagnosing either a living patient or a pictorial representation of a long-deceased 
mystic; the stages of the disorder were fixed, the onlooker simply had to know what he was 
looking for. This practice underlines the significance of Iconographie photographique de la 
Salpêtrière for Charcot’s project. Janet, in contrast, did not merely look at his patients; he 
talked to them too.20  
Unlike Charcot, Janet did not conceive of the shadowy disorders he studied as 
possessing the patient, rendering everything she said disease-inspired babble. Talking to 
patients enabled Janet to study traumatic memories and the subsequent effect of these 
memories on consciousness. What he discovered received high praise from William James: 
I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has 
occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science is the 
discovery, first made in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is 
not only the consciousness of the ordinary field, with its usual center 
and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories, 
thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the 
primary consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious 
facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs.21  
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The phenomena of doubling or of having two selves had long been a feature of the hysteria 
diagnosis.22 Janet, however, did not picture a single, simple personality subject to replacement 
by or alteration with the sick self, but rather conceived of multiple levels of personality within 
the subject in complex interaction with each other. James’s own terminology for describing 
this multiplicity, “extra-marginal,” is discussed later. Janet understood these multiple levels 
through the idea of “dissociation.”23 In line with leading theories of his time, Janet considered 
consciousness to consist of a continuous chain of fields of attention: what James terms “the 
ordinary field, with its usual center and margin.” A “dissociated” personality, in Janet’s 
thought, was caused by the rupture of this continuous chain by some form of trauma. 
Thereafter, the patient’s consciousness became divided with two or more distinct, discrete 
chains of attention running parallel to each other. In Janet’s view psychological disorders 
were the product of interference between these chains.24 Hypnosis, as a therapy, was used as a 
way of returning to the site of personal trauma and of offering some means of resolution to the 
traumatized self. 
Eliot learnt about the effects of this trauma in his reading, as a graduate student, of 
Janet’s Névroses et idées fixes [Neuroses and obsessions] (1898). His notes to the volume are 
held at the Houghton Library, Harvard, one of which translated phrases from the following 
text:  
Observation 51: la dissociation cérébrale […] il fut évident qu'il 
accomplissait une foule d'actions absurdes. Il prenait des soins excessifs 
de sa toilette, prenait deux bains par jour et changeait de chaussettes 
toutes les deux heures. […] C'est l'Esprit qui avait eu l'obligeance de 
prendre la direction de son hygiène, qui l'accusait de malpropreté, le 
forçait à ces lavages continuels. […] l'esprit se vengeait, il lui déchirait 
ses vêtements, lui cassait ses meubles, mettait le désordre dans ses 
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papiers. […] dernièrement on a retiré de l'eau ce pauvre homme, qui 
s'était jeté dans la Seine et il est rentré tout mouillé à la maison, dans un 
état pitoyable. [Observation 51: cerebral dissociation [...] it was evident 
that he was performing many absurd actions. He took excessive care of 
his personal cleanliness, taking two baths a day and changing his socks 
every two hours. [...]It was the Spirit who had been kind enough to 
direct his hygiene regime and which had accused him of being dirty and 
forced him to wash constantly. [...] the Spirit avenged disobedience: the 
Spirit tore his clothes, broke his furniture, and muddled his papers. [...] 
Recently, this poor man had to be removed from the water after 
throwing himself into the Seine; he returned to his house soaking wet 
and in a pitiful state.]25 
“The spirit” here in Janet’s diagnosis is the result of “cerebral dissociation.” The man’s 
dissociated consciousness, split off from the mainline of his personality at some point hidden 
in the past, has begun to interfere with the functioning of his primary consciousness. The 
patient can hear what Janet considered a “secondary self” making exaggerated demands for 
and about his personal cleanliness. In his doctoral dissertation, Eliot was struck by the 
difficulties facing both patient and doctor in such situations. For Janet, to inform the patient 
that this was a case of dissociation did not make the demands of the spirit seem any less real; 
and likewise in order for the patient to appreciate Janet’s idea he would need to undergo a 
course of successful therapy, at which point he would no longer see the world the way he saw 
it previously. The point of view of the sick patient, on the one hand, and the points of view of 
the doctor and the cured patient, on the other, approach the irreconcilable. Eliot used such 
cases in his doctoral thesis to challenge the account of the transmutation of error offered by 
the British idealist philosopher F.H. Bradley.26 
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 Nancy Gish has established the significance of Janet’s work for one of Eliot’s major 
critical essays: “When Eliot famously wrote of the ‘dissociation of sensibility’ in ‘The 
Metaphysical Poets’ [...] he was drawing on a widely held and pervasive theory of 
consciousness, the original texts for which he had read and two of whose authors – William 
James and Morton Prince – were well known in the Boston of his college years.”27 Murray 
McArthur has also noted that Janet lectured at Harvard in 1906, when Eliot was a college 
freshman, and explored some of the continuities between the lectures and Eliot’s subsequent 
work.28 I note below the use made of Janet’s ideas in the psychology of religion, and suggest 
that a major impact that Janet’s ideas had on Eliot’s work was through their unsettling of the 
relationship between science and religion. In line with this and before moving on to 
subsequent reinterpretations of Janet, I want to tease out some of the complexities involved in 
what Gish terms Eliot’s “drawing on” Janet’s insights.  
 While “dissociation of sensibility” represents a special use of the term Eliot shared 
with Janet, the phrase is out of step with the ways in which Eliot typically used either 
“dissociate” or “dissociation.” In Eliot’s lexicon, for the most part, the terms refer to the 
judicial separation of ideas in critical analysis: “literary standards help us to […] dissociate 
the social and the histrionic from the unique” or “The Criterion is interested, so far as politics 
can be dissociated from party politics, from the passions or fantasies of the moment, and from 
problems of local and temporary importance.”29 “Dissociation” was the word that Ezra Pound 
chose, too – recognizing the significance of the French equivalent for the critical practice of 
the subject of his essay – when he wanted to praise a work by Remy de Gourmont, writing: 
“we find in it typical dissociation.”30 Criticism as practiced by discerning critics thus involves 
the breakup of complex ideas into their constituent parts, with “dissociate” and “dissociation” 
functioning as synonyms for “distinguish” and “distinction,” respectively. “Distinction” 
appeared in the essay on Bradley that Eliot included in his Selected Essays, where Eliot 
9 
argued for the superiority of the idealist philosopher’s cultural criticism when compared to 
that of Matthew Arnold. This was an argument Eliot based on the philosopher’s insistence 
upon the “distinction […] between the individual as himself and no more, a mere numbered 
atom, and the individual in communion with God.”31 Arnold, according to Eliot, failed to 
dissociate the needs of the many from the needs of one – an age-old philosophical quandary 
and a central concern for late-nineteenth-century idealist philosophers on both sides of the 
Atlantic – and ran together the different needs of both, bringing into question his claim to the 
title of “critic.”  
The inspiration for the phrase the “dissociation of sensibility” – as Louis Menand has 
noted – came from de Gourmont’s essay on the French poet and great model for Eliot, Jules 
Laforgue: 
Son intelligence était très vive, mais liée étroitement à sa sensibilité. 
[…] Mais à force de vivre, on acquiert la faculté de dissocier son 
intelligence de sa sensibilité: cela arrive, tôt ou tard, par l’acquisition 
d’une faculté nouvelle, indispensable quoique dangereuse, le 
scepticisme. Laforgue est mort avant d’avoir atteint cette étape. [His 
intelligence was very keen, but closely linked to his sensibility. […] But 
by dint of living, one acquires the ability to separate the intelligence 
from the sensibility. This happens, sooner or later, through the 
acquisition of an essential, if nevertheless dangerous, faculty: 
skepticism. Laforgue died before reaching that stage.]32 
De Gourmont was interested in the tensions between the activities of the mind and those of 
the senses; the argument itself is a model of the critic’s power of dissociation – his ability to 
see the differences between “l’intelligence et la sensibilité [the intelligence and the 
sensibility]” – even though he concerns himself with the fact that Laforgue never lived to 
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dissociate the two. Eliot shared de Gourmont’s fascination. Yet, where the French critic 
contemplated with pleasure “la lutte perpétuelle [the perpetual struggle]” between 
“l’intelligence et la sensibilité” in the mature work that Laforgue, had he lived, might have 
produced, Eliot rues the fact that such distinction ever became necessary: “something 
happened to the mind of England between the time of Donne or Lord Herbert of Cherbury and 
the time of Tennyson and Browning.”33 Dissociation here has become pathological, and is no 
longer evidence of maturity. In this sense, the essay takes a place between Max 
Nordau’s Degeneration (1892) and Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents (1930) as a 
psychobiography of the times, which complicates claims that Eliot’s backward glance towards 
Elizabethan England is simply a matter of “nostalgia.”34   
Eliot’s decision to break a stylistic habit might well be explicable on the basis of the 
different contexts in which Eliot and de Gourmont use “dissociation.” For Eliot, it is a word 
that relates to critical practice – it is the job of the man of letters to dissociate adequately – 
while the poet’s task, according to “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” involves “fusion.”35 
In this case, “The Metaphysical Poets” carries with it an implicit criticism of de Gourmont’s 
willingness to see “dissociation” reflected in poetic practice, too. Nevertheless, Eliot’s “mind 
of England” indicates that “dissociation” is not only unnatural, at least in poetry, but also a 
historical event distinct from questions of personal development. Eliot turns back to a pre-
modern paradisiacal moment at which point poets were, he claims, able to: “feel their thought 
as immediately as the odour of a rose.”36 The very fact that a critic can or needs to dissociate 
intelligence and sensibility is a mark of underlying trauma; in a healthy society, thought and 
feeling would work together in a single activity, he opines, and there would be no need to 
distinguish between the two. The critical function itself is an outcome of a more virulent 
pathology. In “The Metaphysical Poets,” too, sensibility and the intelligence seem, like 
Janet’s primary and dissociated consciousnesses, to have become two distinct states with the 
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dissociated sensibility liable to interfere with the work of the intelligence. Thus, Janet’s 
understanding of “dissociation,” which is tied to psychological illness, nudges out Eliot’s 
habitual usage of “dissociation” as evidence of a well-functioning critical brain. 
 An explanation for this shift can be seen in the way “The Metaphysical Poets” brings 
together both therapeutic – Eliot insisted “psychology is […] justified, if at all, by its 
therapeutic value” – and poetic concerns. The “dissociation of sensibility” was something that 
tantalized Eliot and his readers alike in its claim to be both an ongoing dilemma that faced the 
practicing poet – Eliot’s Poems (1920), collecting his terse, metaphysical-inspired quatrain 
poems, had been published the previous year – and a historical phenomenon that had further-
reaching consequences than poetry alone. The two were not necessarily distinct for Eliot: 
“The problem of nationalism and the problem of dissociated personalities may turn out to be 
the same,” he cryptically suggested elsewhere.37 “Sensibility” walks the line between the 
claims of perception and those of history insofar as it denotes not only “power of sensation or 
perception” (OED, 2a), but also the “capacity for refined emotion; delicate sensitiveness of 
taste; also, readiness to feel compassion for suffering, and to be moved by the pathetic in 
literature or art” (OED, 6). The first citation of “sensibility” in the latter sense is more or less 
contemporary (1756) with Rousseau’s Julie, or the New Heloise (1761) and Emile, or On 
Education (1762). Eliot’s word choice identifies both a local problem – the creation of two 
distinct faculties – and the societal implications, as a faulty poetic consciousness overflows 
into the cult of sensibility – a testament to the burgeoning of romanticism.  
The possibility of a cure remains. The symptoms of the disorder, in Eliot’s diagnosis, 
are evident in the slippage between his use of the word “feel” (“feel their thought”) – where 
tactility is at the forefront of a poet’s mind and indicative, too, of a particular way of 
experiencing one’s feelings – and the emphasis on “emotions” in the cult of sensibility. The 
issue at stake is not only the proportion of intellect and sensation in a given perception, but 
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also a change in the way one encounters the world: one does not “feel;” one has the “capacity 
for refined emotions.” Eliot’s diagnosis implies that the new modernist aesthetic – the self-
consciously “difficult” poetry he mentions elsewhere in the essay – could serve as a course of 
treatment for this pathology: a means through which one could, if not feel one’s thought, at 
least bypass the cult of sensibility. A poet, he reminded readers later, is “always trying to 
defend the kind of poetry he is writing.”38  
Yet, Eliot’s mind is itself divided over such therapeutic claims. On the one hand, there 
was the possibility of the new art reconfiguring society’s collective understanding and, on the 
other, there was a concern with the historicity of that “something” that happened “between” 
certain dates. This historicity attracted scholars associated with F.R. Leavis’s 
journal, Scrutiny, such as L.C. Knights, who sought to identify the economic conditions that 
facilitated pre-dissociation-of-sensibility society: 
The economic organisation from which the bulk of Elizabethan social 
morality derived was that of the small, local community in which 
“human problems can be truly perceived” – an organisation, then, that 
was not merely “economic” – not merely determined by “economic” 
motives.39 
Jason Harding, too, noting this tendency, adds: “It was left to Eliot's Cambridge followers, 
such as Basil Willey, who had attended his Clark Lectures, to ransack seventeenth-century 
intellectual history in an attempt to substantiate the ‘dissociation of sensibility’ as an historical 
fact.”40 
Leaving the historical research to his “followers” wasn’t necessarily a matter of choice 
on Eliot’s part.  He applied for a research fellowship at All Souls College, Oxford in order to 
develop his Clark Lectures –an expansion of the themes and arguments of the canonical essay, 
“The Metaphysical Poets” – into a three-volume critical work. He described the project as: 
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A study, focused upon a definite point, of the temper and mind of the 
period from Henry VIII to Cromwell, and [which] must take account of 
influences and interests political, philosophical, theological and 
social.41 
“Mind” has a psychological resonance – as in “losing one’s mind” – but the list of “influences 
and interests:” “political, philosophical, theological and social,” overtly omits the 
psychological. The omission is underlined by Eliot’s decision to replace the “dissociation of 
sensibility” with the “disintegration of the intellect” in the text of his lectures.42 Eliot wanted 
to write an intellectual history that identified the moment of rupture in time and explained its 
causes; that is, to establish the “historical fact” of the “disintegration of the intellect,” as the 
“dissociation of sensibility” had then become.43 Despite Gish’s wish to suggest the term’s 
equivalence with “dissociation,” “disintegration” has either a technical sense in Eliot’s 
vocabulary – “I have always agreed (in the rough) to Mr. Robertson’s ‘disintegration’ of the 
Shakespeare Canon” – or else marks social processes – “it will appear that English literature 
is in a state of disintegration into at least three varieties of provincialism –” or political ones:  
It is not particularly the Treaty of Versailles that has separated nation 
from nation; nationalism was born long before; and the process of 
disintegration which for our generation culminates in that treaty began 
soon enough after Dante’s time.44 
“Disintegration” is not a word with overt psychological associations for Eliot. Thus, if Janet’s 
account of “dissociation” enlivened Eliot’s reading of de Gourmont’s essay on Laforgue, Eliot 
remained uncomfortable with the presence of Janet in his work, even at times attempting to 
eject that presence. The poet-critic was not in any way trying to implement a program derived 
from Janet. The mediations between the two were far more complex.  
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II. “The Frontiers of Consciousness:” Poetry and the Subliminal Mind 
 
The complexity of the relationship between Eliot and Janet is occasioned by the fact that Eliot 
did not encounter the French psychologist’s ideas in Janet’s work alone. Janet’s ideas were 
repurposed by subsequent interpreters in a way that took them outside the mainstream of 
psychological discussion, but proved influential in the psychology of religion. Eliot 
encountered the adapted ideas in the writings of William James and Evelyn Underhill, and 
these figures had, in turn, been inspired by Frederic W.H. Myers, the classicist, inspector of 
schools, and leading figure in the Society for Psychic Research, who coined the term and 
identified the phenomenon known as “telepathy.”45 Alongside numerous contributions to the 
proceedings of the Society for Psychic Research, Myers is best known for Human Personality 
and its Survival of Bodily Death (1903), published, fittingly for a book so titled, 
posthumously. Within this monumental two-volume work and drawing on Janet, Myers 
developed an account of human consciousness that would be popularized by James and 
Underhill.  
Myers followed Janet’s argument as to the multiplicity of personality without 
accepting the French psychologist’s assumptions that multiplicity was always a symptom of 
an underlying disorder.46 Instead, Myers argued that various levels of personality were a 
constitutive part of human life; an increased capacity for making contact with other layers of 
consciousness, he suggested, was in fact an example of what would later be recognized as 
evolutionary change.47  
Myers’s exposition of his ideas was hindered, as Jeffrey Kripal argues, by his 
counterintuitive terminology. While he wanted to overcome the vertical organization of the 
subconscious or dissociated selves model with a primary personality on top and a dissociated 
self running beneath, Myers chose terms that invoked such a relationship. Consciousness was 
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marked by a “threshold,” or a limen, with normal consciousness above the threshold – 
“supraliminal” – and everything outside this termed “subliminal:” the classical suffixes, 
“supra” and “sub,” invoking the above-and-below dynamics at the same time as this model 
attempted to distance itself from this understanding.48  
Looking beyond these verbal difficulties, Myers saw consciousness as a continuum 
with normal consciousness accounting for only a fraction of the total consciousness available. 
He considered his findings to be comparable with the contemporaneous discoveries of 
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum – radio waves in 1886 or x-rays in 1895 – and the 
realization that the human eye was only able to see a fraction of the light available.49 Unlike 
the eye, however, Myers saw consciousness as being shaped by two very different needs: the 
“naturalistic and social way via our supraliminal self” and the “spiritual and transcendental 
way via our subliminal self;” as the human race evolved, he argued, it might develop in either 
direction with the former limiting the functioning of the mind to an even smaller portion of 
the consciousness spectrum and the latter expanding it.50  
Myers summarized the situation in Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily 
Death: 
There exists a more comprehensive consciousness, a profounder 
faculty, which for the most remains potential only […N]o self of which 
we can here have cognisance is in reality more than a fragment of a 
larger Self, revealed in a fashion at once shifting and limited through an 
organism not so framed as to afford its full manifestation.51  
Psychical research was an important activity, in Myers’s view, because it provided rare 
examples of the subliminal gaining ascendency – becoming more than “potential only,” even 
in “an organism not so framed as to afford its full manifestation” – over the supraliminal 
consciousness; it thus enabled access to other modes of encountering the world. 
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Myers’s notion of consciousness influenced James, following their work together – 
albeit on different sides of the Atlantic – in the Society for Psychic Research, and led James to 
modify the views he had expressed in the his foundational textbook, Principles of Psychology 
(1890).52 In particular, James’s later work on religious psychology is lit by the account of the 
mind recorded in Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death, but to which James 
was introduced, through the 1890s, via Myers’s working papers.53 James’s work was one of 
the conduits, to Eliot, for this model of mind. In his Notes on Philosophy, Eliot fastened onto 
a passage that demonstrated James’s debt to the English writer: 
Our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, 
is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from 
it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness 
entirely different.54 
James’s “potential forms of consciousness entirely different” recalls Myers’s multiplicity of 
consciousness, while the “filmiest of screens” dramatizes the arbitrariness of Myers’s 
“limen.” James’s description of different forms of consciousness “all about” rational 
consciousness, as if normal consciousness were under siege, confers a degree of agency on 
these “potential forms.” These levels of consciousness might well be part of an individual’s 
capacity for seeing the world, but they are so distant from the rational mind that they strike 
one with the force of new knowledge. The “limen” and the “filmiest of screens” anticipate, 
though delineated with greater technical precision, what Eliot would later refer to as the 
“frontiers of consciousness,” beyond which he envisioned the poet working.55 To venture into 
these new regions, already surveyed by Myers and James, is to encounter another world, a 
world that lies, strictly speaking, outside oneself, and at the very least requires a re-
designation of the self’s borders and boundaries. 
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James argued that, if God were to act through men and women, he would most likely 
do so via interaction with the subliminal mind, an insight that helped Evelyn Underhill better 
understand the mystics with whom she worked. Underhill was a popular writer on religion 
whose first major work, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s 
Spiritual Consciousness (1911), went through twelve editions between 1911 and 1930; it 
remains an important and oft-used introduction to the field to this day. In Mysticism, 
Underhill argued that the transformation of the life and perspective of the mystic was 
achieved by God’s acting through “that ‘spiritual spark,’ that transcendental faculty which, 
though the life of our life, remains below the threshold in ordinary men.” The term 
“threshold” is borrowed from Myers.56  
Eliot picked up on this debt. In his reading notes, Eliot responded to Underhill’s 
locating of the mystic’s transformation in the subliminal conscious by recording aspects of her 
comment on visions: 
If we would cease, once for all, to regard visions and voices as 
objective, and be content to see in them forms of symbolic expression, 
ways in which the subconscious activity of the spiritual self reaches the 
surface-mind, many of the disharmonies noticeable in visionary 
experience, which teased the devout, and delighted the agnostic, would 
fade away.57  
“Visions and voices” in Underhill’s account are the result of uprushes from the subliminal 
mind with which the conscious mind has struggled. Her noting of the “symbolic” potential of 
visions, with the implicit comparison between the visions of the poet and of the mystic, is an 
important corrective to Charcot’s yoking of mysticism and hysteria. Yet in her attempt to 
defend the reputations of saints and mystics, Underhill comes close to explaining such 
religious visions away. She suggests that because modern psychology has identified the 
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origin, within the human psyche, of “visions and voices,” their value can be ascertained more 
clearly. James, however, insisted that the origin revealed nothing about the value of “visions 
and voices;” the worth of “visions and voices” could only be determined on the basis of the 
behavior these experiences encouraged and the lives lived in response to such moments. It 
remained possible to use even this form of psychology to explain away challenging aspects of 
religion, a charge that Eliot repeatedly leveled at liberal Christianity or Anglican theological 
modernism, even noting that the mere mention of The Varieties of Religious Experience 
(1902) invited readers to brace themselves for such interpretative maneuvers.58 Nevertheless – 
and whatever Eliot’s differences with Underhill on religion and “symbolic” importance may 
have been – the movement between “subconscious activity” and the “surface-mind” was a 
subject in view throughout The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (1933).  
 This comes to the fore in Eliot’s account of what the act of poetic “invention” meant to 
John Dryden. Responding to the dictionary definition of “invention” – which included the 
word “devising” – Eliot wrote: 
The word “devising” suggests the deliberate putting together out of 
material at hand; whereas I believe that Dryden’s “invention” includes 
the sudden irruption of the germ of a new poem, possibly merely as a 
state of feeling (UPUC, 616). 
While “invention” does not exclude the “deliberate putting together out of materials at hand,” 
it includes something like a “Eureka!” moment: “the sudden irruption of the germ of a new 
poem,” an unexpected and revealing arrival. “Irruption” was a word favored by Myers; he 
used the word to describe the invasion of the normal waking consciousness, often triggered by 
moments of stress, by deeper and darker movements from the other side of the threshold, as in 
the “irruption of subliminal into supraliminal life.”59 The OED, however, neglects this 
psychological usage, offering only: “The action of bursting or breaking in; a violent entry, 
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inroad, incursion, or invasion, esp. of a hostile force or tribe” (OED, 1). The word was picked 
up, in Myers’s quasi-technical sense, by James, Underhill, and Eliot.60  
 During the term of his Professorship at Harvard in 1932-1933 – where he had read 
about the subliminal mind twenty years earlier – Eliot’s return to what Gilbert Murray in an 
article for the English Review described as the “mysticism of the subliminal soul” involved a 
revisiting of his earlier accounts of the production of poetry.61 Eliot would later draw attention 
to the relationship between the lectures he delivered at Harvard and published as The Use of 
Poetry and the Use of Criticism and earlier critical essays like “Tradition and the Individual 
Talent” and “The Metaphysical Poets” (UPUC, 575). The emphasis in these early essays had 
fallen on technique and the transformative nature of the artistic process: “it is not the 
‘greatness,’ the intensity, of the emotions, the components, but the intensity of the artistic 
process, the pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes place, that counts.”62 Eliot 
may well have felt that he had overemphasized the degree to which poetry was produced from 
a “deliberate putting together out of materials at hand” (UPUC, 616). In the later lectures, 
Eliot thus fell back upon the notion of the subliminal mind in order to bring out the sense of 
shock, uncertainty, and newness in the writing of poetry that he felt he had underemphasized 
at the beginning of his career.  
 Eliot, nevertheless, supplemented rather than replaced his earlier assumptions. In his 
penultimate Harvard lecture, Eliot used arguments taken straight from “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” to challenge the Jesuit scholar of mysticism, Henri Brémond. In Poetry and 
Prayer (1927), Bremond had established what he considered the equivalence between poetry 
and mystical experience. Eliot refuted the idea that a poem could be called an “experience:” 
“By the time [the experience] has settled down into a poem it may be so different from the 
original experience as to be hardly recognizable;” a change instituted by the combining and 
fusing pressures of the aforementioned artistic process (UPUC, 678). The move between the 
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early and the mid-career Eliot involves reassessment; not a resignation of the iconoclastic 
emphasis on technique that energized his early criticism, but rather a willingness to admit that 
the source of poetry is more elusive than he had previously allowed.  
The reassessment is ultimately clinched in a moment of striking candor: 
That there is an analogy between mystical experience and some of the 
ways in which poetry is written I do not deny […] I know, for instance, 
that some forms of ill-health, debility or anaemia, may (if other 
circumstances are favourable) produce an efflux of poetry in a way 
approaching the condition of automatic writing – though, in contrast to 
the claims sometimes made for the latter, the material has obviously 
been incubating within the poet, and cannot be suspected of being a 
present from a friendly or impertinent demon. […] To me it seems that 
at these moments, which are characterised by the sudden lifting of the 
burden of anxiety and fear which presses upon our daily life so steadily 
that we are unaware of it, what happens is something negative: that is to 
say, not “inspiration” as we commonly think of it, but the breaking 
down of strong habitual barriers – which tend to reform very quickly 
(UPUC, 686). 
The critic who claimed, in the manifesto he printed at the beginning of his carefully 
curated Selected Essays, that a poet is best considered a highly wrought creative intelligence, 
of unified mind and attention, here recognizes the importance, to his work, of weakness and 
vulnerability in the form of “ill-health, debility or anaemia,” just as “the sudden lifting of the 
burden of anxiety and fear which presses upon our daily life so steadily that we are unaware 
of it” contrasts with the earlier single-minded emphasis on bringing together a variety of 
feelings into new and arresting combinations.63 In a way that sets this insight apart from the 
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work of Charcot, Eliot retrospectively discovers the presence of disease and illness in his 
conception of the creative process, but refuses to issue a condemnation; the possibilities of 
illness and insight sit side by side. There are thus clear comparisons here with the model of 
the subliminal mind I trace through this essay: the filial relations between “barriers” and 
James’s “filmiest of screens” or the Myers-Underhill usage of “threshold;” the importance of 
stress and illness in instigating the movement between the different layers of mind; and the 
sense of a long “incubation,” a topic discussed at great length in James’s Myers-inspired 
account of conversion in The Varieties of Religious Experience.64  
 The psychological theories that lie beneath the surface of the “dissociation of 
sensibility” break through here. Eliot’s recourse to the subliminal mind – an important 
working hypothesis for psychic researchers at the turn of the twentieth century – as a means 
of understanding the creative process thus provides a complement to his famous earlier 
analogy, in “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” of the platinum catalyst as a way of 
representing the poet’s mind at work.65 The Society for Psychic Research and Eliot’s interest 
in chemical reactions not only bring out two facets of the scientific practice surrounding and 
at times inspiring literary modernism, but also reveal how close the relationship between 
religion and science was.  
Mysticism, in particular, for Myers’s great collaborator, William James, was a major 
focus of The Varieties of Religious Experience, not because James considered it antithetical 
to scientific study, but owing to the fact that mystical experience was an aspect of religion that 
could be recorded and measured using methods drawn from the sciences.66 Thus, alongside 
James Longenbach, I recognize the importance of “mystical knowledge,” “transcendent 
moments,” and “visionary ability” to Eliot’s life and thought, and note that, at times, Eliot 
himself and his subsequent critics have underplayed these facets of his work.67 Longenbach 
argues – at least partly as a way of unsettling accounts of the “classical” Eliot, who was 
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committed to order and a particular understanding of tradition – that this aspect of the poet-
critic’s work should be located within “a Romantic tradition.”68 I nevertheless suggest that 
Eliot’s engagement with mysticism should not only be construed as a retrospective turn 
broadly in keeping with his much-discussed nostalgia for Elizabethan Anglicanism, but also 
an exploration of the porous borders between science and religion that were very much an 
element of modernist religious culture. 
 
III. Aboulie and the Other Kingdom in “The Hollow Men” 
 
The porous boundaries between science and religion provide a context for Eliot’s claim, made 
in the talk on Chapman delivered in Cambridge in 1924 and discussed earlier, that 
“psychology” and “theology” are intimately connected, a facet of Eliot’s thought that is not 
immediately apparent from his emphasis elsewhere on the significance of Christian dogma.69 
The Cambridge talk dovetailed with Eliot’s creative concerns. In a letter to Ottoline Morrell, 
Eliot explained, speaking of poems that went on to appear in “The Hollow Men” (1925), that 
“they are part of a longer sequence which I am doing – I laid down the principles of it in a 
paper I read at Cambridge, on Chapman, Dostoevski & Dante.”70 The central insight of the 
paper was the idea of a character inhabiting multiple planes of existence: “that more or less 
consciously the personages [in a given literary work] are acting, and accepting, inevitable 
roles in this world, and that the real centre of their action is in another Kingdom.”71 This 
“another kingdom” has a familial relationship with the various kingdoms of “The Hollow 
Men:” “death’s other kingdom,” “death’s dream kingdom,” “the twilight kingdom,” the “lost 
kingdom,” “death’s twilight kingdom” and that of “For Thine is the Kingdom” to which the 
verse looks and from which it shrinks.72 The lyric voice – with its yearning for alternative 
worlds – shares William James’s fascination with the possibility of there being “potential 
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forms of consciousness entirely different” just out of our reach. Our way of seeing the world – 
in both James’s account and the lyric sequence – is forever on the cusp of being transformed 
by incursions from these other worlds, be they construed in religious or scientific terms.  
In the context of Eliot’s Cambridge lecture, the idea of “another kingdom” as a center 
of action left Eliot dissatisfied with psychoanalytic readings of literary characters. Eliot wrote: 
“I question the legitimacy of applying psychology to a fictitious character: apply it to the 
author if you like, but not to his world – once you are in it.”73 Eliot’s contention was that the 
application of psychology to fictional characters obscures the designs an author may have for 
his or her creations, designs a reader should be willing to explore once in the world the author 
has created. The complicating factor is that these designs may not be immediately apparent to 
authors themselves. Characters are driven, Eliot explained, by longing, on the part of authors 
and to different degrees of consciousness, for “another kingdom” that results from “nostalgia 
for spiritual life amongst peoples deadened by centuries of more and more liberal 
protestantism.”74 The acts of literary creation, the development of authors’ own worlds, are 
refracted through this wider spiritual need. This historical-religious context, Eliot argued, 
precipitated the psychological tensions that he examined throughout The Varieties of 
Metaphysical Poetry. 
The spiritual deadness Eliot identified weighs on not only “The dead land” of “The 
Hollow Men,” but also the “deadness” of the language of the sequence: the repetitions of 
“death,” “dead” and “dying” – the words appear nine times across the five sections and two 
epigraphs; the diction, which with a few notable exceptions is ruthlessly pared down in 
comparison to the verbal abundance of The Waste Land and in the lifeless staccato declarative 
statements that open the first and third sections (TSE, 79; 81). Christopher Ricks, for instance, 
finds the poem “drained of all affect” and, more recently, Katherine Ebury has compared this 
linguistic deflation to the entropic activity of a dying star.75  
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This historical situation, Eliot noted, had psychological ramifications for authors: 
modern writers were unable to focus on the task at hand. Chapman, Dostoevsky and others try 
to write the plots they have planned and the characters they have considered, but drift off 
inadvertently into explorations of “another kingdom.” While the Cambridge paper was 
dedicated to the exploration of characters in fiction and drama, the idea was central to Eliot’s 
criticism of Donne in his Clark Lectures: 
I wish only to indicate how often we feel that there is something else, 
some preoccupation, in Donne’s mind, besides what he is talking about; 
his attention is not only often dispersed and volatile; perhaps it is so 
because it is really distracted.76 
In Eliot’s view, psychoanalytic readings of texts were limited because they couldn’t give an 
adequate account of this “distraction.” Indeed, focus on the “preoccupation” in a character’s 
mind, rather than the historical and theological situation in which the author operated, made 
the “preoccupation” under consideration impossible to understand.  
Eliot himself had been, on his own account, pathologically preoccupied in the years 
leading up to the composition of “The Hollow Men.” In 1921, Eliot suffered from what he 
considered a bout of “neurasthenia,” brought on not only by the strain of a visit from his 
mother and brother, but also – according to Robert Crawford – the pain of their departure.77 
Having secured a three-month leave from his bank job, Eliot first sought a rest cure at 
Margate; after this failed to help, he travelled to Lausanne to put himself under the care of Dr. 
Roger Vittoz.78 Vittoz’s treatment program, set out in Traitement des psychonévroses par la 
rééducation du contrôle cerebral (‘Treatment of Neurasthenia by means of Brain Control’) 
(1911), included practical activities that sought to increase a patient’s concentration and 
reduce distraction and indecisiveness.79 These techniques were predicated on the notion of 
multiple layers of consciousness. In particular, Vittoz argued that the two levels of 
25 
consciousness he identified within the mind needed to work in harmony with each other; 
disharmony led to neurasthenia, a condition that Vittoz characterized as a disease of the will 
and which prohibited sufferers from making firm decisions.80 Vittoz’s approach, insofar as it 
is attentive to different levels of consciousness, is comparable to the psychological systems 
surveyed earlier in this essay, all of which conceived of the mind as something more complex 
than everyday waking consciousness alone. Yet Myers’s own work challenged the idea of a 
tightly controlled relationship between different levels of mind and the quest for harmony. 
What makes his notion of the subliminal mind so compelling is that incursions into the 
waking mind can happen anytime, anywhere. Myers and James were both fascinated by 
individuals within whom the waking mind seemed extraordinarily open to irruptions from the 
subliminal mind – irruptions that provided flashes of insight into what these other forms of 
consciousness might be like and the new world they might usher in. This interest feeds Eliot’s 
ambiguous accounts of both distraction in Chapman, Donne, and Dostoevsky, and the 
“dissociation of sensibility.” While the historical processes that led to the loss of focus Eliot 
examined are to be regretted, this division of mind is necessarily a feature of the work – other 
than that of Dante, of course – that Eliot most admired, and the dividedness of such work is a 
condition of its openness to the possibility of spiritual transformation. 
 The fact that Eliot was drafting portions of The Waste Land while under treatment in 
Lausanne has encouraged a number of studies pairing the 1922 opus and Vittoz, but the 
preoccupation of both Eliot and Vittoz with “aboulie” or a lack of will power also informs the 
opening of “The Hollow Men.”81 The limpid figures of the sequence take their color – or lack 
of it – from this nexus of concern: 
We are the hollow men 
We are the stuffed men 
Leaning together 
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Headpiece filled with straw. Alas! 
(TSE, 81) 
“Leaning together” shapes up as an adverbial clause, but the anticipated action never comes; 
“Headpiece filled with straw” reveals the grammatical function of both lines as adjectival 
phrases that like “hollow” and “stuffed” elaborate on the lackluster condition of these 
scarecrows of men, while ensuring that the figures remain static. The opening declaratives 
are, too, oddly uncertain of themselves. Does emphasis fall on “are” so as to insist with 
weariness on the permanence of the attribution of these men as “hollow,” “stuffed?” Or does 
the reader emphasize the communal “we” to bring out the shared nature of the fate recounted 
in what follows? In part, this turns on the degree of self-consciousness one imagines the lines 
imbibing: are they asking for sympathy or disgusted with themselves for their self-pity? In his 
1947 recording of these lines, Eliot moves from a relatively high-pitched and measured 
delivery of “Headpiece filled with straw,” which sounds almost robotic, to a deeper, richer 
voicing of “Alas!;” he also elongates the second syllable so that the pronunciation rhymes 
with “farce” (matched with “grass” two lines later in the rhyme scheme).82 Here, Eliot 
indicates vocally the incommensurability between the plight and the pity; what is so pitiful 
about the hollow men is their inability to elicit pity. All the elaboration on the lives of these 
figures leads to nothing. The first four lines do not simply fail to move forward; they write 
themselves off.   
This inertia is a product of both the psychological distress Eliot endured in the early 
1920s and the “spiritual deadness” the opening lyric can’t bring itself to name, but which he 
discussed as an invited lecturer in Cambridge. The struggle mimed by the language of the 
poem brings the concerns of the Cambridge lecture into relief. The author of “The Hollow 
Men” intuits a pervasive spiritual crisis and wrestles with words in order to give shape to his 
account while also mulling over the possibility of this crisis having pathological origins; by 
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contrast, the ease with which Eliot-the-lecturer speaks of the “spiritual deadness” of the entire 
post-medieval world gives reason for pause. He sounds all too glib. A phrase like “death’s 
other kingdom” remains impossible to parse; the phrase not only refuses the historical 
arguments that Eliot mulls over in his prose, but also remains capable of travelling in a 
number of directions. The “death” of “death’s other kingdom” is freighted with the “spiritual 
deadness” Eliot discussed in his talk on Chapman without shying away from Vittoz-inspired 
pathology. Yet it also anticipates – insofar as this is an “other” kingdom rather than this one – 
a different understanding of death. This is what Eliot would later call “the belief […] in holy 
living and holy dying, in sanctity, chastity, humility, austerity;” “dying,” here, serves not as 
the opposite to all that is living, but rather as a necessary stage within a life, capable, too, of 
instigating transformation.  
While dramatizing the “spiritual deadness” Eliot lectured on, “The Hollow Men” 
remains open to spiritual possibilities. The most notable example appears in the fourth lyric: 
Sightless, unless 
The eyes reappear 
As the perpetual star 
Multifoliate rose 
Of death's twilight kingdom 
 
The hope only 
Of empty men. 
(TSE, 83) 
The Latinity of the polysyllabic “multifoliate,” drawing on and fine-tuning the note struck 
with “perpetual,” sounds out against the muted vocabulary of dead, death, and dying. The 
Roman origin of the term in a poem with a preference for words of Anglo-Saxon derivation 
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highlights its otherness. A. David Moody cites one such other world insofar as he presents the 
phrase as evidence that the entire poem is structured around the “very modes of Dante’s 
sensibility:” “multifoliate rose” ascending away from the austere world of the opening of the 
sequence and into “the phantasmagoric and the visionary.”83 “Multifoliate rose” comes from 
somewhere else and it is precisely an elsewhere – albeit of questionable status – that the 
phrase offers the “empty men” with whom the stanza closes. The religious vision has more in 
common with the work of Myers and James than with Vittoz. While Eliot’s treatment with the 
Swiss psychologist feeds the lethargic lyric voice, the willingness of the poem to explore the 
faint glimpses of alternative worlds owes more to the momentary ruptures of insight explored 
in accounts of the subliminal mind.   
 A similar approach is evident in the vision of a very different kingdom captured in the 
third lyric: 
Is it like this 
In death's other kingdom 
Waking alone 
At the hour when we are 
Trembling with tenderness 
Lips that would kiss 
Form prayers to broken stone. 
(TSE, 82) 
The sensuality of “Trembling with tenderness” is felt in the tailing off of “tenderness,” while 
the dactylic rhythmical arc of the line promises a luscious ease in a stanza in which the 
preponderance of monosyllables makes choosing stress and rhythm a difficult task. It 
promises what is just out of reach as the near miss of a rhyme between “tenderness” and 
“kiss” realizes, but this eroticism – the potential for a human, bodily connection – presents an 
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alternative to what is otherwise dead, death, and dying. Sex, like the religious vision 
encapsulated in the “multifoliate rose,” offers a potential, if only momentarily envisioned, 
escape route. The visionary flashes of the sequence – the willingness to explore brief yet 
powerfully conceived alternatives to the prevailing aboulie – reveal the driving force behind 
Eliot’s reading in mysticism and his particular penchant for psychological theories of 
irruption.   
The different worlds of sex, medicine, and religion juxtaposed in “The Hollow Men” 
came together, too, in disturbing fashion in the image from Iconographie photographique de la 
Salpêtrière with which I opened. In the poem, neither the spiritual nor the sexual worlds 
replace the paralyzed present, but their presence arguably transforms that present; by the close 
of the sequence, the shapeless malaise that infuses the poem has been imprinted with the 
contours of these alternatives. The shift sideways from despair to one of the other kingdoms 
and back again, rather than the march forward towards an endpoint, is the characteristic 
movement of the poem; the famous refusal to end with a “bang” is, at least partly, a comment 
on the work’s method of proceeding (TSE, 84). 
In examining Eliot’s relationship with strands of psychology that began with Charcot, 
I have sought to avoid the suggestion that Eliot simply lifted an idea from one area of 
discourse and applied it in his poetry and criticism. Such an approach jars with the method of 
“The Hollow Men.” I have explored some of the ramifications that the previously discussed 
theories of mind had upon Eliot’s work, but Eliot did not undertake what he termed in 
“Tradition and the Individual Talent” the “great labour” of working himself into Janet’s orbit 
as the poet-critic did first with Laforgue and later with George Herbert.84 I have described 
instead aspects of the intellectual and cultural background that informed his life and work. 
This background is not monolithic. The psychology of religion as developed by Myers-James-
Underhill not only makes a case for religious experience – a case to which a man of mystical 
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sensibilities like Eliot could not help but respond – but also offers a far-reaching re-reading of 
such phenomena that means that the skepticism so long associated with Eliot is never far 
away. Eliot’s interaction with this divided thought world helped shape the rapid shifts of tone 
in the poem – that movement between kingdoms – from the hobbled opening of the sequence 
to the visionary potential of “multifoliate rose.”  
Thinking back to the images with which I opened, the poem affords a lens through 
which one might view the Ecstasy of St. Margaret of Cortona, the baroque oil painting in 
which Charcot and his disciples found visual evidence of hysteria. “The Hollow Men” records 
moments of almost unbearable suffering, and one would have found countless examples of 
comparable struggles, often exacerbated by the conditions of treatment, on the wards of the 
Salpêtrière. Charcot, the great doctor of hysteria, attempted to read the visual history of 
religious phenomena as a continuation of the disorder that occupied much of his professional 
life, and Eliot’s poem enacts its own diagnostics: the opening “Ah!” has more contempt than 
sympathy for the hollow men. Yet the sequence does not stop there. “The Hollow Men” 
surveys alternatives to its current state, including those that would genuinely transform the 
perspective it offers on the world or worlds. With this approach in mind, there is no reason 
why one should not find, with Charcot and his collaborators, something disturbing in 
paintings like the Ecstasy of St. Margaret of Cortona, but also remain open to the possibilities 
of religious illumination for which others hope.   
 
IV. Eliotic Conversions  
 
Two years after publishing “The Hollow Men,” Eliot was baptized in a Church of England 
chapel. Despite making a declaration of faith in midlife, Eliot avoided speaking of his 
religious life in terms of conversion.85 Barry Spurr suggests that this reluctance was a result of 
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the association of the practice of “conversion” – often accompanied by an emotional 
reorientation and moral reversal of aspects of one’s previous life – with Methodism.86 
Methodist conversion narratives played an important role, too, in the development of the 
psychology of religion; the emotional nature of many of these experiences enabled a number 
of researchers to exclude semantic content from their studies of religion – this, in Spurr’s 
analysis, was precisely what Eliot was attempting to distance himself from.87 Conversion 
experiences became something like hysterical attacks, and religion could be once more 
explained away as the preserve of those who, in some way or other, were weak-minded. 
In The Varieties of Religious Experience, James used the idea of the subliminal mind to 
counter such notions. The forces behind a conversionary experience might build up over time 
as the religious consciousness developed in parallel with one’s existing way of seeing the 
world, but when this new consciousness burst in on the waking mind it struck with the force 
of new knowledge.88  
Conceived of in this way, James’s understanding of conversion and religious 
phenomena more widely makes room for both mysticism and skepticism. James explores 
origins, but does not – unlike Charcot – equate those origins with value.89 The development of 
the subliminal mind is a way of explaining a certain type of conversionary experience, but this 
explanation does not encode a judgement as to its worth. One could see the activity of the 
subliminal mind as the activity of God or a result of pathology. This tradition in the 
psychology of religion remains properly skeptical about religious phenomena, but 
nevertheless open to the possibility of religious illumination; it is in this context that two well-
documented, if apparently antithetical, aspects of Eliot’s thought and work – mysticism and 
skepticism – can be brought together. 
 The accommodation necessary for writing about Eliot and religion, given his 
fascination with mysticism as well as his ingrained skepticism, was not in evidence in the way 
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in which he initially presented his new-found faith to his reading public. In the preface to For 
Lancelot Andrewes (1928), Eliot infamously declared: “I am a classicist in literature, a 
royalist in politics and a Catholic in religion.”90 He lived to regret the comment. If this creedal 
statement served as a dividing line, at least in the public imagination, between his pre- and 
post-baptismal work, I have, instead, explored the continuities between the periods: the same 
model of mind is in view in “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921) and The Use of Poetry and the 
Use of Criticism (1933), albeit configured somewhat differently. Ideas recounted in Janet, 
Myers, James, and Underhill informed and even encouraged the faith Eliot acknowledged in 
1927, while also shaping his understanding of the creative process and feeding into his own 
creative output.  
There is a nexus of related concerns here: aesthetic, religious, and scientific among 
them. In exploring the intersection of these factors in Eliot’s work, I endeavor to respond to 
Charles Taylor’s characterization of a life of faith within modernity as being shaped by the 
very visible presence of other religious options, be that no faith, an idiosyncratic spirituality 
of one’s own, or another faith.91 The awareness of selecting one of these religious options 
over another is thus an integral part of the religious condition in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. Taylor’s notion is distinct from the idea, popularized by a range of secularization 
theorists, of religion as a consumer choice, and instead he insists that the visible presence in 
the modern world of other possibilities – regardless of one’s willingness to pursue them – 
marks the limits to and the complications of one’s own faith. Eliot’s penchant for both 
mysticism and skepticism that looks, at times, like a personal quirk – the critical attitude most 
readily associated with modernism, combined with a nostalgic or even romantic sensibility – 
can instead be seen as an exemplar of a broader religious condition. 
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